



Methods of protecting developments related to plants can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century, as it can be observed from the Paris Convention of 1883. 
Article 1(3) of this Convention extends the possibility of protecting living mate-
rial under industrial property rights, but ‘does not stipulate […] the form of that 
protection’1. From the 1950s, plant-breeders moved for a sui generis protection 
for their developments ‘on the grounds that patent protection was not suitable’2. 
This led to the adoption of the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (upov) in 1961[3]. In Europe and the US, protection for 
developments related to plants have evolved between patent and plant-breeders’ 
rights systems. The upov Convention was amended in 1978[4] and 1991[5] in view 
of the plant-breeders’ needs and intersections between this sui generis form of 
protection of plant varieties and the patent system. In 1994, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (trips) retook this issue. 
The objective of trips is to harmonise protection and enforcement of intellectual 
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1. m. llewelyn, ‘From gatt to gatt: Intellectual Property Rights & Genetics Fifty 
Years After Crick & Watson Part I’ (2003/4) 6 (3) Bio/Science Law Review, pp 107-117.
2. Ibid.
3. The 1961 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants.
4. The 1978 Act of the upov Convention. 
5. The 1991 Act of the upov Convention.
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property rights in all Member States of the World Trade Organization (wto)6. In 
this regard, Article 27(3)(b) of trips requires Member States to provide protec-
tion for plant varieties ‘either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or 
by any combination thereof ’7. While the article requires Member States to grant 
protection for plant varieties, this not only allows them to exclude plant varieties 
from patent protection but also does not specifically refer in the upov Conven-
tion to being the effective sui generis system. Setting apart to some extent the 
plant-patenting issues, in this paper I will critically analyse whether the 1991 Act 
of the upov, and this act alone, is the only effective sui generis protection that is 
compatible with Article 27(3)(b) of trips. First, I will provide an overview of the 
upov Convention and Article 27(3)(b). Secondly, I will critically analyse whether 
the 1991 Act of the upov Convention is the only effective sui generis protection 
of plant varieties. Finally, I will conclude on whether there is not only one effec-
tive sui generis system.
I. did drafters of article 27(3)(b) 
have in mind the upov Convention?
In this section I will briefly look at the connexion between this article and the upov 
Convention. Member States of the wto are required by Article 27(3)(b) of trips 
to provide protection for plant varieties. This obligation, as observed by Llewelyn 
and Adcock, reflects not only the economic interest to foster innovation in this 
field, but also ‘the resulting intellectual property expectations of most developed 
countries’, either by patents or by plant-variety rights8. Europe and the US have 
had debates about private property rights over plant material for about a hundred 
years, establishing protection for plant varieties before trips was in place, either 
by patent or by plant-breeders’ rights systems, although with certain differences9. 
Within the development of those debates, upov was introduced as a sui generis 
form of protection for socially and commercially significant results of agricultural 
plant-breeding, predominantly plant varieties10, which provides private rights to 
exclusively commercially exploit those varieties. In Europe, as noted by Llewelyn, 
the possibility to provide either patents, plant-variety rights, or both forms of 
protection for plant varieties in the European system11 was strengthened with 
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, 
Morocco, 15 April 1994.
7. trips, Article 27(3)(b).
8. Op. cit. 1.
9. m. llewelyn & m. Adcock, European Plant Intellectual Property (Oxford, Hart, 
2006), pp. 116-117. 
10. Ibid, pp. 135. 
11. Novartis/Transgenic Plant [1999] epor 123; Novartis/Transgenic Plant [2000] epor 
303; Council Directive (98/44/EC) on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
[1998] O.J. L 213, Article 4(2), Recitals 29–32.
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the removal of the misinterpreted dual protection-prohibition from the upov 
Convention in 1991[12]. In the US, virtually all plant material is subject to pat-
ent protection, which allows the system to provide the opportunity to obtain a 
number of combinations of protections for plant varieties among utility patents, 
plant patents, and plant-variety protection certificates13.
However, the drafters of Article 27(3)(b) had to deal not only with strong but 
also diverse plant-variety protection practices of the US and Europe, but also with 
resilience from developing countries, wherein patents and plant varieties’ rights have 
been considered as being developed-country-centric and anti-communitarian14. In 
effect, the concerns raised were that those exclusivity systems have implications ‘for 
access to seeds (particularly with regard to use in further breeding programmes), 
possible erosion of traditional varieties and a reduction of biodiversity’15. It is worth 
noting that this kind of argument was put in place to abolish patent laws in countries 
such as the Netherlands, between 1869 and 1912, and as a result of that monopolistic 
practices deterred indigenous innovations16. As llewelyn and Adcock observed17, 
on the one hand the security of protection for plant varieties wanted by developed 
countries was ensured by making it mandatory. On the other hand, the opposition 
by developing countries was addressed by holding the matter open for signature by 
new members in the 1978 upov Act. The advantages of this act, divergent from the 
1991 upov Act, are essentially the dual protection-prohibition and the permission 
for farmers to save seeds for subsequent use without paying royalties, known as the 
farmers’ privilege, and that this act does not require members to provide protection 
to all species and genera, which allows the securing of free access to key crops. As the 
1978 upov Act would be in force at the same time as the 1991 upov Act, it is ‘easy 
to understand why, if upov were the only sui generis system, no mention is made of 
the Convention’ in the Article 27(3)(b) of trips’18. The vagueness of this provision, 
however, may be possibly intended to permit alternative methods of protection19. 
Therefore, although the preferred effective form of protections for many were those 
of the upov Conventions, particularly the 1991 upov Act, any deviation from this 
would have ‘to be proved to be “effective” by the country introducing it’20. I shall 
now discuss which compliance methods can be derived from the wording of Article 
27(3)(b) of the trips and current forms of protection.
12. M. llewelyn, ‘From gatt to gatt: Intellectual Property Rights & Genetics Fifty 
Years After Crick & Watson, Part ii’ (2003/4) 6 (4) Bio/Science Law Review, pp. 142-162.
13. Op. cit. 9, p. 98. 
14. Ibid., p. 126. 
15. Ibid., p. 117. 
16. M. Khor, “Rethinking intellectual property rights and trips”, in P. drahos and 
R. mayne (ed.) Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 214-224.
17. Op. cit. 9, p. 127. 
18. Ibid. 
19. K. Raustiala and D.G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ 
(2004) 58 (2) International Organization, pp. 277-309. 
20. Op. cit. 9, p. 127. 
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II. Is there only one effective sui generis protection?
Two points are key to answering this question: first, identifying what must be 
protected, and second, verifying what provides effective sui generis protection21. 
While the ‘plant variety’ definition was removed from the upov Convention in 
1978, a new definition of variety was established in 1991. The 1991 upov Act 
defines variety as ‘a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank’22. However, this act distinguishes between a variety that is protectable 
because it meets the technical requirements (distinctness, uniformity, and stabil-
ity) and a variety that is not protectable but is taken into account for the purpose 
of common knowledge and distinctness23. The definition intended to distinguish 
material protectable by breeders’ rights (plant groupings) and material protectable 
by patents (genetic components) but certain overlap exists, as the former includes 
internal genetic components and the latter includes a plant variety derived from a 
patented process24. The possibility for mandatory cross-licensing between patent 
and breeder rights owners established by the Biotechnology Directive confirms 
this overlap25. Although the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (itpgr) 
also defines plant variety, this definition matches the non-protectable variety 
definition of the 1991 upov Act26. It is, therefore, possible to identify what can 
be protectable by a sui generis system. Moreover, some have suggested that each 
country may establish its own definition of plant variety subject to protection27. 
Now, let us discuss what would be an effective system.
llewelyn and Adcock point out that there are three possible methods of 
complying with the obligation laid down by Article 27(3)(b) of the trips: 1) by 
establishing ‘patent protection and/or sui generis protection which accords with 
upov’, 2) by excluding plant varieties from patent protection but setting forth a 
‘sui generis system which conforms to neither patent law nor upov’, and 3) by 
both patent protection and a non-upov sui generis right28.
On the one hand, the third method has not been explored by any country29 but 
on the other hand, the US and Europe protection practices did not only already 
comply with the first method, but also served for the drafting of that article, as 
commented above. While the US system virtually allows a several combination of 
21. Ibid., p. 117. 
22. 1991 upov Act, Article 1(vi).
23. wipo, Introduction to intellectual property: theory and practice (Kluwer Law Inter-
national, London, 1997). p. 462.
24. Op. cit. 9, p. 124. 
25. Biotechnology Directive, Article 12.
26. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Rome 
3 November 2001, Article 2. 
27. M. Blakeney, ‘Access to Genetic Resources, Gene-based Inventions and Agriculture’ 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Study Paper 3b (2002). [www.planttreaty.
org/sites/default/files/accessGRGBRA.pdf ] (accessed 20 June 2014).
28. Op. cit. 9, p. 125. 
29. Ibid. 
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protection of plant varieties between patents and upov style protection, in Europe 
there are four dissimilar levels of plant-variety rights provisions in operation30: i) 
the 1991 upov Act, which lays down minimal standards for plant varieties protec-
tion and to which the European Union (EU) is party, ii) the Community Plant 
Variety Rights established by the EU31, which expands the minimum standards 
of the 1991 upov Act, particularly in key points such as the farm-saved seed, but 
establishes a dual protection-prohibition, iii) the 1978 upov Act, which also allows 
the farm-saved seed, as commented above, and to which several EU Member States 
are adherents32 and iv) the 1961 upov Act, to which Belgium is party33, plus the 
fact that Greece and Luxembourg are not adherents to upov but are EU Member 
States34. In Asia, different levels of protection also exist. The Japanese system 
provides the possibility of dual protection of plant-variety material by patents 
and breeders’ rights35. Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tajikistan provide patent protection 
for plant varieties36. While China has adopted the 1978 upov Act, another 11 
countries have adopted the 1991 upov Act (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Singapore, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam)37. 
In view of these diverse levels of protection, the 1991 upov Act alone is not the 
only effective sui generis system. However, it is the preferred one. By 14 June 
2014, 72.22% of the members of upov (52 from 72 members), are signatories to 
the 1991 upov Act38. The remaining members are party to the 1978 upov Act, 
with Belgium as an exception39. The adoption of this act by developing countries, 
nevertheless, may be derived from pressures by developed countries in the form 
of foreign technical assistance40 and trade agreements41.
Now, the second method to comply with Article 27(3)(b) is a highly controversial 
issues. While trips does neither lay down which are the conditions for an effective 
sui generis system nor who is entitled to establish them, other international treaties 
regarding genetic material has relevance to the design of that system, particularly the 
30. Ibid., p. 151. 
31. Council Regulation (2100/94) on Community plant variety rights [1994] O. J. L 227.
32. upov, Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants, Status on June 10, 2014. [www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/members/en/pdf/
pub423.pdf ] (accessed 18 June 2014). 
33. Ibid. 
34. Op. cit. 9, p. 151. 
35. P. lertdhamtewe, ‘Asian approaches to international law: focusing on plant pro-
tection issues’ (2013) 8 (5) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, pp. 388-398.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Op. cit. 32.
39. Ibid. 
40. D. Robinson, ‘Sui Generis plant variety protection systems: liability rules and 
non-upov systems of protection’ (2008) 3 (10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice, pp. 659-665.
41. G. downes, ‘trips and food security: Implications of the wto’s trips Agreement 
for food security in the developing world’ (2004) 106 (5) bfj, pp. 366-379.
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Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd)42 and the itpgr43. The view of the Member 
States of the wto essentially has been, on the one hand, that an effective sui generis 
system should have features practically similar to those of the patent or 1991 upov 
Act protection forms: conditions for protection (namely novelty, distinctiveness, 
uniformity, and stability), a term of protection that allows recovering investments, a 
scope of rights (broadening the protection to plant variety), exceptions (experimental 
use and breeders’ exemption), procedures for obtaining, cancelling, and enforcing 
protection44. The most favoured nation and the national treatment of fundamental 
principles of trips should be also taken into account45. On the other hand, it has 
been pointed out that the effective system should provide protection to innovations 
from indigenous and local farming, ensuring the traditional farmers’ right to save and 
exchange seeds and sell the farmers’ harvest, benefit-sharing of genetic resources46, 
and prevent ‘anti-competitive rights or practices which threaten the food sovereignty 
of developing countries, as it is permitted by Article 31 of the trips’47. The African 
Union’s Model Legislation for the Protection of Indigenous Knowledge (oau Model) 
was another source for supporting this position, particularly by Kenya48. This model 
is one of the most comprehensive attempts to balance access to biodiversity, benefit-
sharing, and intellectual property49. While the EU has conceded that implementing 
harmonised plant-variety systems may have ‘adaptations to ensure special national 
needs’50, it seems from the wto available online archives51 that there is still no con-
sensus over the conditions to establish which is an effective sui generis system. The 
oau Model mostly used to support arguments against the upov style has not yet been 
widely adopted across Africa. Curiously, rather than seek inspiration from the oua 
Model, ‘Kenya has not only adhered to upov, but acceded to it’52. Notwithstanding 
this lack of consensus, there is a considerable number of countries that have already 
opted for alternative plant-variety protection systems that address their own particular 
needs. For example, 18 Asian countries: Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, 
42. Convention on Biological Diversity, Nairobi, 1992. 
43. trips Council, ‘Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(B): Summary of Issues 
Raised and Points Made’ IP/C/W/369/Rev.1, 9 March 2006.
44. Ibid.
45. trips Council, ‘Communication from the European Communities and their member 
States’ Review of Article 27.3(b) of the Trips Agreement, and the relationship between 
the Trips Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd) and the protec-
tion of traditional knowledge and folklore, A Concept Paper. IP/C/W/383, 17 October 
2002, paragraph 77.
46. cbd, Article 1. 
47. Op. cit. p. 43. 
48. D. Rangnekar, ‘Geneva Rhetoric, National Reality: The Political Economy of 
Introducing Plant Breeders’ Rights in Kenya’ (2014) 19 (3) New Political Economy, pp. 
359-383.
49. N. Zerbe, ‘Biodiversity, ownership, and indigenous knowledge: Exploring legal 
frameworks for community, farmers, and intellectual property rights in Africa’ (2005) 
53 Ecological Economics, pp. 493-506.
50. Op. cit. p. 43. 
51. wto, trips: Issues, Article 27.3b, traditional knowledge, biodiversity. [www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm] (accessed 20 June 2014).
52. Op. cit. p. 48.
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Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkmenistan53. Lertdhamtewe 
points out that these sui generis plant-variety protection systems are essentially 
based on earliest systems of this kind, the Thailand and the Indian Systems54. These 
systems not only have characteristics similar to the 1978 upov Act55, but also have 
several differences. While the Thailand system requires disclosure of the geographi-
cal origin of the material and future uses within the application, the Indian system 
requires information about any contribution in breeding or developing the variety56. 
The protection exclusivity term provided by these systems is for between 12 to 17 
years, according to the variety type. It may be argued that this term discourages in-
novation, as it is shorter than the ideal term for encouraging innovation of at least 
20 years claimed by the US57. There has not been enough evidence, however, ‘of a 
corresponding boon to R&D in the public sector’58. What is more, India has been 
within the top five countries with the maximum number of variety registration cer-
tificates by 2011, and varieties of crops from those top systems (EU, US, Canada, 
and Australia) were also notified for registration in India59. Certainly, this may in 
part be because the Indian system was based on the 1978 upov Act, as a result of 
the initial proceedings to adopt the act. The development of the system with strong 
input from both breeders and society resulted in the adoption of important differ-
ences, such as in conditions of protection, benefit-sharing, and protection of farm-
ers60. The Thailand system ‘recognises farmers’ traditional rights to save and re-use 
seeds from their harvests by incorporating the concept of farmers’ rights’ established 
in the itpgr, and the Indian system also provides a farmers’ right to exemption61. 
This is an exception that the EU has conceded may be seen as compatible with 
trips (Articles 27(3)(b) and 30) and even with the 1991 upov Act, as developing 
countries ‘could create within their national laws broader farmers’ exemptions for 
the benefit of subsistence farmers or small farmers’62. The Monsanto Canada Inc v 
Percy Schmeiser case is a clear example of the importance of this exception, in view 
of the potential of breeders using the upov style system to be ruthless in prosecuting 
infringement63. Furthermore, the particular difference between the Thailand system 
and the patent and upov systems is that the former ‘allocate rights to local farmers, 
53. Op. cit. p. 35.
54. Ibid.
55. Op. cit. 40.
56. Op. cit. 35.
57. Op. cit. 43.
58. Op. cit. 41.
59. P. Brahmi and V. Chaudhary, ‘Protection of plant varieties: systems across coun-
tries’ (2011) 9 (3) Plant Genetic Resources, pp. 392-403.
60. J.K. plahe, ‘trips Downhill: India’s Plant Variety Protection System and Implica-
tions for Small Farmers’ (2011) 41 (1) Journal of Contemporary Asia, pp. 75-98.
61. Op. cit. p. 35.
62. Op. cit. p. 45.
63. P. Cullet, ‘Monsanto v. Schmeiser: A Landmark Decision concerning Farmer Liability 
and Transgenic Contamination’ (2005) 17 (1) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 83-108.
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tribes or indigenous groups’, a feature that clearly addresses the objectives of the cbd 
and responds to trips Council’s recommendations64. As the Indian system, this is 
compatible with itpgr and cbd, which provides the possibility to ‘entitle a farmer’s 
variety to protection, even though such a variety might not be new’65. However, the 
Thailand system and other Asian systems following it provide inadequate protection 
for the communities’ local rights, as ‘they do not create any practical means for local 
societies to enjoy the benefits’66. It is observed that practically ‘no farmers or local 
communities are able to register their varieties’67. This undermines the ability of 
these systems to be completely effective. These systems may though be improved to 
achieve complete effectiveness. On these grounds, the 1978 and/or the 1991 upov 
Acts are not the only effective sui generis systems to protect varieties. The equal legal 
standard of trips and the cbd, plus the itpgr and the wording of Article 27(3)(b) 
provide a basis to developing an alternative effective sui generis form of protection. 
The India system is an example of an alternative system with important success. 
The current alternative systems, however, require further development to achieve, 
for example, acceptable ways to ensure that local societies enjoy benefits. The use 
of this flexibility by developing countries is questionable, as they have pressures to 
private and exclusive forms of protection, as the debate in the trips Council shows. 
Moreover, states that opt for the 1991 upov Act not only have to adopt it but also 
follow its guidelines and example plant varieties’ local law draft set forth by upov68. 
This is the case of the Draft of Protocol for Protection of New Varieties of Plants by 
the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (aripo), which followed the 
guidelines and recently submitted such regional legislation for revision before upov69.
Conclusion
In this paper I have briefly given an account of the reasons for considering that 
there is not only one ‘effective sui generis system’ to comply with the obligation 
laid down in Article 27(3)(b) of trips, in view of the intentional vagueness of the 
wording of this article. The no mention in trips of the 1991 upov Act as an ef-
fective sui generis protection system for plant varieties, plus related international 
treaties, particularly the cbd and the itpgr, provides great scope to interpret what 
is an effective sui generis system. The upov 1991, and upov 1991 alone, is not the 
only effective system to protect plant varieties that meets the obligation set out in 
64. Op. cit. 35.
65. Op. cit. 43.
66. Op. cit. 35.
67. P. lertdhamtewe ‘Plant variety protection in Thailand: the need for a new coher-
ent framework’ (2013) 8 (1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, pp. 33-42.
68. upov Council, ‘Guidance for the preparation of laws based on the 1991 Act of 
the upov Convention’ upov/inf/6/3, 24 October 2013.
69. upov Council, ‘Examination of the conformity of the draft aripo protocol for 
the protection of new varieties of plants with the 1991 Act of the upov Convention’ 31 
Extraordinary Session, Geneva, April 11, 2014. C(Extr.)/31/2.
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Article 27(3)(b), as the different levels of protection in Europe and Asia illustrate. 
This article allows enough flexibility to develop effective protection forms that 
are not necessarily completely compatible with the patent and upov style systems. 
Current alternative systems, particularly the Thailand and Indian systems, have 
included important institutions that are in line with cbd and itpgr, such as 
benefit-sharing, farmers’ privileges, and disclosure of origin. They require, however, 
further development. For example, they should elaborate acceptable ways to ensure 
that local societies enjoy benefits. The use of this trips’ flexibility by developing 
countries apparently will continue even under pressures by developed countries, 
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